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COMMENTS
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-TIME OF PAYMENT OF A CHECK
Introduction
Under the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, the drawer
of a check is entitled to have a stop order honored if he gives
such an order before the check is accepted, certified, or paid.1
In Bohlig v. First National Bank in Wadena,2 the problem was
presented as to what the word "paid" means. The drawer of
a check sued the drawee bank for its failure to obey a stop order.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota found for the drawer-plaintiff
on the following facts. The payee had deposited the check with
his own bank. The payee's bank sent the check through regular
banking channels to the drawee, which received it, perforated it
with the word "Paid," the date, and its transit number, and
charged the amount to the drawer's account. The drawee bank
then deposited in the mails a remittance draft, which included
the amount of this check, addressed to the payee's bank.3 At
this point, the drawer gave his verbal stop order.4 The bank
refused to act, claiming that the stop order had come too late.
It said that the check had already been paid. Both parties
agreed, and it was so found by the court, that the drawee could
have intercepted the remittance draft, under existing postal
regulations, before it reached its destination. On these facts, the
court affirmed the decision of the lower court for the plaintiff-
drawer5 on the grounds that the check had not been paid and
1. MINN. STAT. § 335.743 (1949); NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 189;
BIGELOW, BiLLS, NOTES, AND G}HECKS 146 (3rd ed Lile, 1928) ; BRADY, BANK
CHE=Ks 355-6 (2d ed., with supplement, 1933); BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUAIENTS LAW 1316 (7th ed., Beutel, 1948).
2. 48 N.W.2d 445 (Minn. 1951.)
3. Minn. Stat. 1927, c. 138, p. 214, makes payment by remittance draft
acceptable. Minnesota has not enacted the Bank Collection Code which
contains a provision to the same effect.
4. Although in this case the drawee had by contract limited its liability
to honoring only written stop orders, the court held that since the drawee
had declined to act, not because the order was verbal, but on the sole
ground that it was too late, it had waived its contractual right to a written
order, citing Malmquist v. Peterson, 149 Minn. 223, 183 N.W. 138 (1921),
where Bigelow was quoted. BIGELOW, ESTOPPEL 717 (6th ed.).
5. The court did not discuss whether the drawer was actually indebted
to the payee. If the former was so indebted, the payment would operate
to discharge a debt that would have to be paid anyway. Therefore, having
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that ordinary or customary diligence had not been exercised by
the bank in an attempt to obey the stop order.7
What Constitutes Payments
The cases generally agree that merely stamping or otherwise
mutilating a check to indicate payment does not, in the absence
of other acts, complete payment of a check.9 The cases also
agree that this act, accompanied by a charging of the drawer's
account and either a crediting of the payee's account, a delivery
of cash to the payee, or the placing of a remittance draft into
his possession, does complete payment. (Of course, his agent
may be substituted for the payee in any of the foregoing actions,
and payment is still regarded as having occurred.)'" However, it
is in the situation where more than marking or mutilating the
check, but something less than a combination of the above men-
tioned acts said to complete payment has occurred that agree-
ment ceases.
A large number of jurisdictions follow the rule that the mere
charging of the drawer's account constitutes payment."" A num-
ber of the courts which reach this result do so on the basis of
the Bank Collection Code, which contains a specific provision
to that effect."- Moreover, in many of the cases 3 decided without
suffered no loss, he could not collect from the drawee for failure to stop
payment. BRANNAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 902.
6. The court also held that there was no acceptance or certification of
the check since these must be in writing and signed by the drawee. MINN.
STAT. §§ 335.51, 335.741 (1949) ; NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw §§ 132, 187.
7. The court held that the failure to take any action to prevent payment
of the check after the stop order was given could not possibly be the
exercise of either customary or ordinary diligence when the check was
for $5,000.
8. Professor Aigler points out that courts frequently use the terms
"payment" and "acceptance" interchangeably to mean payment. Aigler,
Rights of Holder of Bill of Exchange Against the Drawee, 38 HARv. L. Rav.
857, 874 (1925).
9. Hanna v. McCrory, 19 N.M. 183, 141 Pac. 996 (1914); Hunt v.
Security State Bank, 91 Ore. 362, 179 Pac. 248 (1919).
10. Tobiason v. First State Bank, 173 Minn. 533, 217 N.W. 934 (1928);
Johnson v. First State Bank, 144 Minn. 363, 175 N.W. 612 (1920); First
National Bank v. Wis. National Bank of Watertown, 210 Wis. 533, 246
N.W. 593 (1933).
11. Keller v. FredericktoxNm Say. Institution, 66 A.2d 924 (Md. 1949);
Union State Bank v. Hibernia Bank & Trust Co., 224 Mo. App. 375, 18
S.W.2d 93 (1929); Morris v. Cleve, 197 N.C. 253, 148 S.E. 253 (1929);
Oregon Iron & Steel Co. v. Kelso State Bank, 129 Wash. 109, 224 Pac.
569 (1924). See Note, 10 A.L.R.2d 428, 429 (1950); Brady, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 311.
12. "Where the item is received by mail by a solvent drawee or payor
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the aid of the Bank Collection Code, the court need not have
relied upon the sole ground of charging the drawer's account,14
even though the court so verbalized its decision. Thus, in
Morris v. Cleve, for example, the drawee had upon receipt of the
check not only debited the account of the drawer, but also de-
livered a remittance draft to the payee's bank. Nevertheless,
the court merely said:
When the drawee bank has to the credit of the drawer
funds sufficient and available for the payment of his check,
and accepts and charges the check to the drawer's account,
the check is .paid....
Despite the fact that, because of the circumstances involved,
these cases could have been decided without this rule, the large
number of decisions which have plainly stated that a charging
of the drawer's account constitutes payment makes the statement
of no small significance.
There are some jurisdictions which hold that a charging of
the drawer's account does not alone complete payment." In
following one of these decisions," the court in the principal case
distinguished it from those holding that a mere charging of the
account completes payment, by pointing out, as was done supra,
that there were in many of these cases other facts supporting
the decision, and that the same result could have been reached
without the rule that a charging completes payment.
bank, it shall be deemed paid when the amount is finally charged to the
account of the maker or drawer." BANK COLLECTION CODE § 7. For list of
states adopting, see BRA.NNAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 133, n.
13. Andrew v. Hartley State Bank, 207 Iowa 407, 219 N.W. 929 (1928);
Union State Bank v. Hibernia Bank & Trust Co., 224 Mo. App. 375, 18
S.W.2d 93 (1929); Morris v. Cleve, 197 N.C. 253, 148 S.E. 253 (1929);
Oregon Iron & Steel Co. v. Kelso State Bank, 129 Wash. 190, 224 Pac.
569 (1924). See Note, 10 A.L.R.2d 428, 429 (1950); BRADY, op. Cit. SUpra
note 11, at 311.
14. Andrew v. Hartley State Bank, 207 Iowa 407, 219 N.W. 929(1928) (payee's agent accepted check)- Union State Bank v. Hibernia
Bank & Trust Co., 224 Mo. App. 375, 18 S.W.2d 93 (1929) (evidence suffici-
ent for jury to find stop order not received in time by drawee); Morris v.
Cleve, 197 N.C. 253, 148 S.E. 253 (1929) (remittance draft delivered to
collecting bank); Oregon Iron & Steel Co. v. Kelso State Bank, 129 Wash.
190, 224 Pac. 569 (1924) (remittance draft delivered to payee).
15. 197 N.C. 253, 265, 148 S.E. 253, 260 (1929).
16. Steinhart v. D.O. Mills & Co 94 Cal. 362, 29 Pac. 717 (1892);
Guardian Nat. Bank v. Huntington County State Bank, 206 Ind 185 187
N.E. 388 (1933); Holdingford Milling Co. v. Hillman Farmers' do-op.
Creamery, 181 Minn. 212, 231 N.W. 928 (1930); Traders' Nat. Bank v.
First Nat. Bank, 142 Tenn. 229, 217 S.W. 977 (1920).
17. Holdingford Milling Co. v. Hillman Farmers' Co-op. Creamery, 181
Mlinn. 212, 231 N.W. 9=8 (1930).
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In deciding the significance of the deposit of a remittance
draft in the mail, the decisions are also in conflict. The majority
of the decisions follow the analogy of the law on the acceptance
of a contract, and hold that a deposit of the draft in the mail
completes payment.,,
However, the minority hold that the remittance draft must be
delivered to the payee or his agent before payment is complete. 9
This view has the support of some legal writers.20 Those holding
this view contend that the rule in the law of contracts set forth
in the English case of Adams v. Lindsel121 should not apply in
the United States, since postal regulations have been changed
to permit the sender to recover mail after it has been posted, but
not delivered. The contention is that although in theory any act
might be selected as constituting acceptance of an offer (or
analogously, some would say, payment of a check), in practice
to have the act occur before the letter is unequivocally out of the
offeree's (or drawee's) control, and before the offeror (or payee)
even knows the act has happened, puts the offeror (or payee)
at great disadvantage. The offeree (or drawee) can, in prac-
tice, remove the letter from the mail without the other party's
knowledge. However, this reasoning does not apply to the prin-
cipal case because it is to the advantage of the payee here, as
in many payment cases, to be paid as soon as possible.
The above position has little support from the courts. 22 Al-
18. Chapman v. Mills, 241 Fed. 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1917); McIntire v. Raskin,
173 Ga. 746, 161 S.E. 363 (1931); Bank of Commerce v. Reis, 253 Ky.
648 69 S.W.2d 754 (1934); Farmers' Guarantee State Bank v. Burris Mill
& Elevator Co., 207 S.W. 400 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918); Canterbury Bank v.
Bank of Sparta, 91 Wis. 53, 64 N.W. 311 (1895). "Mailing a draft to the
collecting bank... should be final [payment]." BRANNAN, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 1233.
19. Steinhart v. D. 0. Mills & Co., 94 Cal. 362, 29 Pac. 717 (1892);
Watt-Hurley-Holmes Hdw. Co. v. Day, 1 Ga. App. 646, 57 S.E. 1033 (1907) ;
Buehler v. G alt, 35 Ill. App. 225 (1889); Guardian Nat. Bank v. Hunting-
ton County State Bank, 206 Ind. 185, 187 N.E. 388 (1933); Holdingford
Milling Co. v. Hillman Farmers' Co-op. Creamery, 181 Minn. 212, 231
N.W. 928 (1930); Traders' Nat. Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 142 Tenn. 229,
217 S.W. 977 (1920).
20. See Notes 92 A.L.R. 1062 (1934); 9 A.L.R. 386 (1920); 17 C.J.S.
405 (1939); 13 CJ. 303, n. 39 (1917).
21. 1 B. & Ald. 681, 106 Reprint 250 (1818).
22. This doctrine was first proposed in 13 C.S. 303, n. 39 (1917), which
relied on the alleged change in U.S. Post Office Regulations (1913) §§ 552,
553 and the English case of Ex parte Cote, L.R. 9 Ch. 27 (1873), where
a letter posted in France was held not to constitute acceptance since
French law permitted the person posting to recover the letter. The rule
was adopted in Traders' Nat. Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 142 Tenn. 229, 217
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though in principle it has merit with regard to the law of con-
tracts, it is almost uniformly rejected even in that field. In
the interest of uniformity of the law, and because this rule would
usually operate to the disadvantage of the payee in the check
situation, it would seem unwise to apply it in determining when
payment has occurred.
Conclusion
The problem in the principal case was whether the acts of the
drawee bank in marking the check "paid," charging the drawer's
account, and putting the remittance draft in the mails constituted
payment so as to relieve it of liability for failure to comply
with the stop order. The courts are not agreed as to what acts
complete payment, but the writer believes that the Minnesota
Supreme Court erred in not holding that payment had occurred
here.
Clearly, merely perforating the check "paid" did not complete
payment. Equally clear is the fact that if the remittance draft
had been delivered, payment would have occurred. We have
seen that many jurisdictions hold that a charging of the drawer's
account completes payment. The court attempts to distinguish
the present case from these on the facts, as was discussed supra,
but the plain words of the decisions that a charging completes
payment can only be ignored at the expense of the law's predict-
ability. If the law is not to be chaos, the plain words of the
courts must be respected. These statements were not dicta, but
even as such they would be entitled to great weight. Similarly,
most jurisdictions hold that when a remittance draft is mailed,
the check is paid. In this case both these acts had occurred.
There is also a policy reason for interpreting payment so as to
favor the drawee bank. It is possible that the bank's actions
might have made it liable to the payee in tort for conversion if it
had halted the draft in the mails. Although most of the cases23
S.W. 977 (1920). This position is re-affirmed in 17 C.J.S. 405 (1939), and
has been adopted by some of the cases. See cases supra note 19, and the
recent Federal case, Dick v. U.S., 82 F. Supp. 326, 329 (Ct. Cl. 1949). The
doctrine is discussed in 9 A.L.R. 386 (1920). The writer there questions
the accuracy of the statement about the change in postal regulations,
stating that recovery of postal items had been permitted earlier, but other-
wise viewing the rule stated with favor.
23. For a discussion of this point see, BRANNAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at
1321-1323; Aigler, supra note 8, at 881-885; Note, 14 A.L.R. 764, 767-768(1921) ; Note, 69 A.L.R. 1076, 1078-1079 (1930) ; Note, 137 A.L.R. 874, 879
(1942).
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holding that the mutilation of a check constitutes a conversion
thereof are situations in which the drawee bank paid the pro-
ceeds to a forger, it is equally true here that the bank might be
said to have handled the check in a manner so inconsistent with
the rights of the owner, the payee, that it converted it.
Many cases hold that only some of the acts of the bank in this
case complete payment. The bank, if it had obeyed the drawer's
order, might have been rendered liable to the payee for conver-
sion. For these reasons, the Supreme Court of Minnesota should
have held that the check had been paid.
JACK L. PIERSON
INSURANCE-CHANGE OF BENEFICIARY BY WILL
In the fall of 1944, the insured, an RAF airman stationed in
Canada, executed his last will and testament. One of the stipula-
tions in the will was that all of his property, including insurance,
should go to his grandmother if he should die unmarried. The
insured had been divorced by his wife several months prior to
the execution of the will. He held two life insurance policies,
and in each of these his former wife was the named beneficiary.
The policies reserved to the insured the right to change bene-
ficiaries, provided that he complied with certain formalities.'
It was conceded that the deceased made no attempt to effect a
change of beneficiary other than by his will. In December, 1944,
the insured was lost at sea in the line of duty, and shortly there-
after was declared dead. The named beneficiary brought an
action for declaratory judgments against the grandmother and
the two insurance companies. The insurance companies, as in-
terpleaders, conceded liability and paid the respective amounts
of the policies into court. The trial court gave judgment for the
grandmother, but this was reversed on appeal 2 and judgment
entered for the ex-wife. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed
the latter judgment by a four-to-three decision. 3
The majority of the court concluded that the named beneficiary
was entitled to the proceeds. They reached this conclusion by
1. The opinion does not disclose the formalities required. Generally, such
policies provide for a change of beneficiary upon written request to the
insurer. The change is then to take effect when indorsements are made
on the policy by the insurer and the insured.
2. Glenn v. Stephens, 44 Ohio 0. 476, 92 N.E.2d 29 (1950).
3. Stone v. Stephens, 155 Ohio St. 595, 99 N.E.2d 766 (1951).
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